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ABSTRACT
Under current UK law, an embryo cannot be transferred
to a woman’s uterus without the consent of both of its
genetic parents, that is both of the people from whose
gametes the embryo was created. This consent can be
withdrawn at any time before the embryo transfer
procedure. Withdrawal of consent by one genetic parent
can result in the other genetic parent losing the
opportunity to have their own genetic children. We argue
that offering couples only one type of consent
agreement, as happens at present, is too restrictive. An
alternative form of agreement, in which one genetic
parent agrees to forego the right to future withdrawal of
consent, should be available alongside the current form
of agreement. Giving couples such a choice will better
enable them to store embryos under a consent
agreement that is appropriate for their circumstances.
Allowing such a choice, with robust procedures in place
to ensure the validity of consent, is the best way to
respect patient autonomy.
Human embryos created by in-vitro fertilisation
(IVF) can be cryopreserved in order to have the
opportunity of using them in future fertility
treatment. The individual circumstances of people
choosing to have embryos cryopreserved vary
considerably. In routine IVF treatment, it is normal
for several embryos to be created, while in the UK
the number of embryos transferred to a woman at
one time usually does not exceed two. IVF thus
commonly produces spare embryos that can be
stored for use in subsequent treatment cycles.
However, it is also possible for embryos to be
created solely for future use, with no intention to
produce an immediate pregnancy. For example, if
a woman is to undergo medical treatment that risks
damaging her fertility, she and her partner may
choose to use IVF speciﬁcally to create embryos
with a view to their future use, after the medical
treatment is completed. Cryopreservation of
embryos has historically been more successful than
cryopreservation of unfertilised oocytes,
1 and
despite recent progress in oocyte storage tech-
niques
2 this is generally believed to remain the case.
In comparison, if a man is to undergo treatment
that risks damaging his fertility, samples of his
sperm can generally be stored for future use in
a process that is effective, usually non-invasive and
inexpensive. A man with cryopreserved sperm and
a fertile female partner will generally have a higher
chance of achieving genetic parenthood than
a woman with either cryopreserved embryos or
cryopreserved oocytes and a fertile male partner.
Couples who store embryos may later separate,
leading to possible disagreements about the use of
their embryos. Since 1990, UK law has stipulated
that embryos cannot be stored or transferred
without the ongoing consent of both genetic
parents, and consent can be withdrawn any time
before the embryos are to be used.
3 This rule applies
universally, regardless of people’s circumstances or
wishes at the time the embryos are created. The
law was tested by the case of Natallie Evans.
45In
2001, Evans and her then ﬁancé, Howard Johnston,
had embryos created from their gametes and then
cryopreserved, before she underwent urgent cancer
treatment that included the removal of her ovaries.
Evans’ relationship with Johnston subsequently
ended and he withdrew consent for the continued
storage of the embryos. Evans opposed the
destruction of the embryos and embarked on a legal
battle that ended in the Grand Chamber of the
European Court of Human Rights, where she lost
her case and, thereby, her sole remaining chance of
having her own genetic children.
6
Evans’ predicament sparked a lively debate about
consent rules,
7e9 particularly in view of the
opportunity for change afforded by the lengthy
review process that was eventually to lead to the
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (2008).
From October 2009, if one genetic parent with-
draws consent to continued storage of embryos,
a 12-month cooling-off period must be observed.
During this period, embryos cannot be destroyed
unless both parties consent.
10 This provision both
allows time for counselling and discussion of the
changed consent (if the parties will engage), and
removes the technical illegality of maintaining
embryos in storage when it is known that one
party has withdrawn consent, during the time that
the other party is being contacted and notiﬁed by
the fertility clinic. It does not, however, end the
vulnerability of a woman in Evans’ position to her
partner withdrawing consent. Even if her partner
wished to commit to a form of legal agreement that
precludes his subsequent withdrawal of consent,
the law does not allow him to do this. Evans had
argued that this restriction of the kinds of
commitments that individuals might make in these
circumstances was a breach of their human rights.
If a man wished to reassure a woman that her
embryos would always be available for her, she
suggested, then it was perverse to prevent him
from doing so because of the ‘primacy of consent’.
This argument did not convince the courts, which
determined that this was an area in which it was
for parliament to legislate and in which a generous
margin of appreciation was appropriate.
61 11 2In
this paper, we accept that this is properly a matter
for parliament and we set out the case for an
alternative form of consent.
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Suppose that the UK were to adopt an alternative consent law,
specifying that once fertilisation has occurred, the genetic
mother has sole control over the use of the embryos. This would
allow a woman in Evans’ situation to maintain her future
potential to be a genetic mother, as far as is medically possible,
without being dependent on the continuation of the relation-
ship with her partner. There is, however, an unavoidable trade-
off between different forms of irreversibility: although allowing
a man the option of withdrawing consent to the transfer of
embryos by necessity involves allowing a woman in Natallie
Evans’ position to lose her chance of becoming a genetic mother,
stating that a man cannot withdraw consent means that he is
irreversibly committed to the possibility of genetic fatherhood
from the moment of fertilisation. These considerations have
been aired in the literature discussing the Evans case.
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It seems to us that there are reasonable arguments on both
sides, with no overwhelming argument in favour of one type of
agreement that should lead us comprehensively to reject the
other in all circumstances. It could be argued that the type of
agreement in which either partner can withdraw consent before
embryo transfer is relatively more appealing when the embryos
are created as part of routine IVF treatment and both partners
have future fertility prospects, whereas the type of agreement in
which one partner cannot withdraw consent after fertilisation is
relatively more appealing in cases in which the embryos repre-
sent the other partner’s only remaining prospect of genetic
parenthood. Not all treatment situations, however, fall neatly
into one or other category. For example, if a woman is towards
the upper age limit for producing viable eggs (typically in her
late 30s or early 40s), then discarding embryos produced when
she was younger will result in her prospects of future genetic
parenthood being considerably reduced.
When couples have a complex range of medical and social
circumstances, we believe that the most important consider-
ation of all in determining the appropriate form of consent
agreement for a given couple is the preference of the two indi-
viduals concerned.
OUR PROPOSAL
We propose that, when embryos are to be created and there is
a prospect of cryopreservation of some or all of the embryos,
couples be offered a choice of agreement about their future use.
One option would be that consent can be withdrawn by either
genetic parent at any time up to embryo transfer, exactly as at
present. We propose a second, additional option in which one
genetic parent can agree to cede control of the embryos to the
other.Underthisoption,itwouldbeuptothegeneticparentwho
retained control to determine in future whether any of the
embryos are transferred, subject to the prevailing regulations for
treatment; the other genetic parent would not have a veto over
their use. Couples would agree, before fertilisation, whether they
choose to share control over the future use of embryos, or alter-
natively, one of them will have sole control. In the event of the
genetic father having sole control, he would be able to seek
a surrogate mother to carry the embryos to term. However, it is
likelythatinmostagreementsinwhichoneparenthassolecontrol
this would be the genetic mother, as she would commonly have
more limited future fertility options than her partner (with
NatallieEvans’situationrepresentinganextremeexampleofthis).
The greater invasiveness of assisted conception methods for
women, in comparison with men, may also have an inﬂuence.
9
There are precedents for allowing people a choice of the type
of agreement in cooperative matters: under English law, for
example, two adults buying a property together can choose
whether to do so as joint tenants or as tenants in common. Our
proposal does not remove any options currently open to people
wishing to store embryos for future use. It simply creates an
extra option that they may choose should they both agree to it.
Whereas an agreement in which one genetic parent has sole
control over the future transfer of embryos might seem to
operate to that genetic parent’s advantage, in some situations it
may also be to the other genetic parent’s beneﬁt to be able to
sign away his or her legal right later to withdraw consent for the
future use of embryos. Suppose a woman facing the imminent
loss of her fertility would like to have embryos created with her
partner, but (in the light of Evans’ misfortune) is unwilling to do
so if he retains the right to withdraw consent. Then it may be in
her partner’s interest to sign an agreement in which he cedes
control of the embryos to her. The scope for a person to beneﬁt
from making a commitment can be shown in formal rational
choice models of strategic interactions.
13
On the basis of the above considerations, we suggest that
there is a strong case in favour of allowing couples a choice over
the future control of stored embryos. We see two possible
objections on fundamental grounds of principle that could be
made against it and now consider each of these in turn. We also
assess the possible practical considerations arising from our
proposal.
POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS
The ﬁrst objection concerns harm to a third partydeither the
child itself or society as a whole.
14 It is likely that our proposal
would result in some instances in which a child is born when its
genetic parents are no longer together, when the child would not
otherwise have been born. The child welfare objection to our
proposal would then be that, given these circumstances of
conception, it would be better for the child not to have been
born. But whether or not one believes that a child’s circum-
stances are better if its genetic parents are together, it is hardly
convincing to claim that a child whose genetic parents separate
before his or her birth has a life not worth living.
Furthermore, research indicates that children born to single
mothers who conceive by donor insemination perform well
against socioeconomic and educational indicators.
15 16 Similarly,
children born from cryopreserved embryos are likely to be born
into households whose average socioeconomic position is higher
than for births in society as a whole. They would, by deﬁnition,
be planned pregnancies and wanted babies, and would be likely
to enjoy high levels of welfare and be unlikely to make
a disproportionately negative contribution to society.
In short, then, the available empirical evidence does not
support the objection that such children would experience poor
welfare or would cause harm to society at large. A further
response might also be found in reference to current UK law and
accepted practice in fertility treatment. The Human Fertilisation
and Embryology Act (2008) removed the requirement that
clinicians must consider the ‘need for a father’ for children
created by fertility treatment, replacing it with consideration of
their need for ‘supportive parenting’. Furthermore, many
fertility clinics in the UK routinely and legally treat single
women. It would be incongruous to ban agreements in which
one genetic parent cedes control over future embryo transfer on
the grounds that resulting children might be born to a parent
who has separated from her partner, while allowing the
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the time of fertilisation to be born into single parent families.
The second objection to allowing a person to cede control over
embryos to his or her partner is that it is wrong to allow
someone to sign away his or her rights to future control over
such an intimate choice. The thought here would be that there
is something so deeply signiﬁcant and personal about repro-
ductive choices that the law should preserve individuals’ rights
to change their minds, even if so doing overrides their current
wishes. In other words, it would be argued that in this situation
it is so important to preserve a person’s future autonomy that
they should be denied the right to make a choice that limits their
future options. The extent, however, to which the law should
constrain a person’s choices for their own good is a matter of
debate. There are various views about exactly when such
restrictions can be justiﬁed;
17 18 however, it is generally held that
such restrictions are more difﬁcult to justify in circumstances in
which a person is acting voluntarily and knowledgeably.
Furthermore, as we have noted already, the mandatory preser-
vation of one genetic parent’s right to veto the future use of
embryos is not costless; on the contrary, it results in an enforced
vulnerability of the other genetic parent to the possible future
loss of the option to use the embryos in fertility treatment.
We believe that any concerns about people acting voluntarily
and knowledgeably would be better addressed by strengthening
consent procedures than by simply not allowing choice. To argue
that an agreement in which a person voluntarily cedes control
over the future transfer of embryos can lead to that person being
forced to become a genetic parent against his or her will is not
valid if he or she freely gave consent, having been well informed
of the implications of the agreement. We note also that in sexual
intercourse men regularly lose control of their genetic material at
the moment of ejaculation and, although there may be some
sympathy for the idea that a man has moral interests in
a pregnancy, men have not been afforded any legal rights (either
of veto or even consultation) in abortion decisions.
Ultimately, any decision about whether the law should fail to
allow an agreement with the aim of protecting an individual’s
best interests or their future autonomy is as much a matter of
values as of empirical facts. We would tend to agree with
Dworkin
19 that, if it is proposed that the law should deny
people choices for their own good, the onus must be on showing
why the choice should not be allowed. We see no reasonable
basis for forbidding a genetic parent of embryos from signing
away the future right to withdraw consent over their use if he or
she does this freely and knowledgeably.
PRACTICALITIES
If a choice of agreements was introduced, one practical concern
might be that this will introduce additional work for fertility
clinics. However, clinics are already required to demonstrate
rigorous procedures for providing good quality information and
recording patients’ decisions. Indeed, the UK Human Fertilisa-
tion and Embryology Authority provides forms speciﬁcally for
the purpose of clearly documenting patient consent decisions. To
enhance the consenting process, individual advice to each of the
partners may be beneﬁcial, in contrast to the focus on ‘couple-
centred’ treatment that prevailed before the 2008 Act. The
revised Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority Code of
Practice (8th edition), applicable from 1 October 2009, places
more emphasis on individuals than couples. Another possible
concern is that the consent process might take longer than at
present. However, it is generally regarded as good practice to
allow couples as much time as they need to reach a comfortable
conclusion. They would then be in a strong position to decide
between themselves their preferred arrangements for the future
use or disposal of embryos arising from their genetic material.
It would of course be possible to allow a greater range of
possible agreements. Increasing the number of types of agree-
ment recognised in law increases the chance that a couple will
ﬁnd an agreement ideally tailored to their needs, but also
increases the complexity of the decision and the risk of litigation
arising from difﬁculties in the precise interpretation of each type
of agreement. We believe that the limited increase in choice that
we are advocating will result in overall beneﬁts that far exceed
the costs. Whether or not increasing people’s options beyond
this would be beneﬁcial overall is less clear.
A second practical consideration concerns time limits over
which an agreement about the use of embryos would apply. It
would be possible to stipulate that in an agreement in which one
partner has sole control, there is no time limit over the duration
of sole control, other than any statutory limits for embryo
storage. Alternatively, there could be a speciﬁc time limit within
which the non-controlling partner would be able to use the
embryos, but if he or she wished to use them outside this limit,
a new agreement or renewal of the original agreement would be
required from the non-controlling partner.
CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO DONOR GAMETES
We have so far considered embryos created by two genetic
parents who are partners. When a gamete donor is used in the
UK, by law the donor has the same right to withdraw consent
before the use of the gametes, or embryos resulting from them,
as does a partner.
10 In our opinion, a distinction can be made,
however, between two different categories of gamete donors.
The ﬁrst category is those who are anonymous to the recipients
at the time of treatment (children created by fertility treatment
in the UK from April 2005 using donated gametes have a statu-
tory right to be given identifying information about the donor
when they reach the age of 18 years). Withdrawal of consent by
such anonymous sperm donors has occurred in the UK, with
serious consequences for patients, including the destruction of
embryos.
20 These donors have neither ﬁnancial obligations nor
any social connection to the recipients or resulting children, yet
the destruction of embryos may have a devastating impact on
the recipients. Moreover, whereas people withdrawing consent
because of the breakdown of their own relationships can at least
identify a cause within their own lives, patients experiencing an
anonymous donor’s withdrawal of consent are victims of what
is to them an arbitrary event over which they have no control.
Given all these considerations, we believe that there may be
a case for imposing limits on the circumstances under which
anonymous gamete donors should be allowed to withdraw
consent; however, this proposition needs a more detailed
examination than can be presented in the present article.
The other category of gamete donors is those who are known
to the recipients at the time of donation. In many such cases,
the donor is a relative or close friend. This leads to the possibility
of a material change in the donor’s social relationship to
a recipient after embryos have been created but before they have
been transferred in an IVF treatment cycle. The arguments for
different forms of consent agreement for cryopreserved embryos
are therefore similar to those previously considered for couples
using their own gametes, and there is again a case for offering
a choice of consent agreements. Allowing joint control between
the donor and the other genetic parent is one logical option;
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genetic parent at the time embryos are created. However,
because there are potentially three interested partiesdthe donor,
the other genetic parent and the genetic parent’s partnerdan
additional option could be to allow the donor to transfer his or
her control to the other genetic parent’s partner.
Further research into the incidence of and reasons for with-
drawal of consent by gamete donors,
20 and its implications for
recipients, siblings, half-siblings, donors and their families would
be useful. Nevertheless, we believe that there is a case for
consent rules for gamete donors to be examined as part of
a general review of consent laws.
CONCLUSION
The present legal framework in the UK allows only a single type
of consent agreement for the future use of cryopreserved
embryos. We propose allowing people a choice of agreement. We
have discussed the advantages of our proposal and possible
arguments against it, and concluded that our proposal better
recognises and protects individual autonomy than the current
legal framework. We also suggest that the current system
particularly disadvantages women, whose biological investment
in reproduction is more substantial than that of men, and who
are more vulnerable to the possible loss of future genetic
parenthood as a result of withdrawal of consent by another
party. Whereas both men and women could choose an agree-
ment that offered the decision about the use of the embryos to
their partner, and the proposal itself is gender neutral, it is likely
that the introduction of a choice of consent agreement would
particularly beneﬁt women.
Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank Luc Bovens, Anne Slowther
and an anonymous referee for comments on this work.
Funding PDS was supported by a Wellcome Trust VIP Fellowship.
Competing interests GMH is an external adviser to the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority and is scientiﬁc director of the Centre for Reproductive Medicine
at University Hospitals Coventry and Warwickshire NHS Trust.
Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.
REFERENCES
1. Gook DA, Edgar DH. Human oocyte cryopreservation. Hum Reprod Update
2007;13:591e605.
2. Homburg R, van der Veen F, Silber SJ. Oocyte vitriﬁcation e women’s emancipation
set in stone. Fertil Steril 2009;91:1319e20.
3. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act. 1990.
4. Sheldon S. Evans v Amicus Healthcare; Hadley v Midland Fertility
Servicesdrevealing cracks in the ‘twin pillars’? Child and Family Law Quarterly
2004;16:437e52.
5. Lind C. Evans v United Kingdom e judgments of Solomon: power, gender and
procreation’. Child and Family Law Quarterly 2006;18:576e92.
6. European Court of Human Rights Evans v the United Kingdom (Application no 6339/
05) Judgment. Strasbourg, 10 April 2007.
7. Hartshorne GM, Avery SM. The Natalie Evans Case. Bull R Coll Pathol
2007;140:64e6.
8. Smajdor A. Deciding the fate of disputed embryos: ethical issues in the case of
Natallie Evans. J Exp Clin Assist Reprod 2007;4:2.
9. Thornton R. European Court of Human Rights: consent to IVF treatment. Int J
Constitutional Law 2008;6:317e30.
10. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, as amended. 2008.
11. Natallie Evans v Amicus Healthcare and others [2003] EWHC 2161 (Fam).
12. Natallie Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd and Others [2004]
EWCA Civ 727.
13. Schelling TC. The strategy of conﬂict. Harvard, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1960.
14. O’Neill R. Informed consent and public health. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci
2004;359:1133e6.
15. Murray C, Golombok S. Going it alone: solo mothers and their infants conceived by
donor insemination. Am J Orthopsychiatry 2005;55:242e53.
16. McCallum F, Golombok S. Children raised in fatherless families from infancy:
a follow-up of children of lesbian and single heterosexual mothers at early
adolescence. J Child Psychol Psychiatry 2004;45:1407e19.
17. Mill JS. On liberty. London: John W Parker, 1859.
18. Dworkin G. Paternalism. In:Zalta EN, ed. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
2009. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paternalism/ (accessed 13 July 2009).
19. Dworkin G. Paternalism. Monist 1972;56:64e84.
20. Sozou PD, Sheldon S, Hartshorne GM. Withdrawal of consent by sperm donors.
BMJ 2009;339:b4297.
J Med Ethics 2010;36:230e233. doi:10.1136/jme.2009.033373 233
Law, ethics and medicine